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Introduction
With the end of the 1980s, we witnessed truly revolutionary changes to the 
European political environment In January 1988, the Commission on 
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, wrote that we will see, m the next twenty 
years, a developing, revolutionary environment revealing "new military 
powers, new technology, new sources of conflict and opportunities for 
cooperation To cope with these changes, we will need versatile and adaptive 
forces "l These nfts in the landscape of political and military thought are 
occurring, driven by a political earthquake never imagined by the current 
generation of world and military leaders In Europe, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance is faced with questions and challenges 
to its strategy and force posture across the entire spectrum of political and 
military sources Through unilateral and negotiated force reductions, a new 
security order is evolving Marxist ideology's predilection to confrontation or 
conflict has softened and threatemng capabilities have been reduced, and in 
some cases eliminated The peak East/West confrontation is past and we will 
see a rapidly declining military posture dnven by the combined forces of 
political realignments, arms control, and budgetary reductions manipulated 
by partisan political and economic agendas
This dynamic security environment is driving a more discriminate 
choice of instruments of political power, and when coupled with the changes 
in the Soviet approach to defense policy, one can envision tremendous 
challenges to NATO's political cohesion and therefore its capability to 
effectively address issues of European security Although now in the shadow 
of German unification, the future character and function of nuclear weapons 
m the deterrent strategy of the Alliance is high among the significant strategic 
questions challenging the United States and NATO
This paper focuses on the European nuclear forces It will briefly 
review the significant decisions that reflect current force structures and the 
status of forces and modernization programs Finally, it will offer an 
assessment of how selected political forces and arms control efforts might 
impact future modernization and deployment plans
Of particular interest in this paper will be the debate over aircraft, 
especially the "dual-capable" systems Soviet and NATO air forces play a 
critical role m their respective alliance's military strategy despite their lower 
profile when compared to the tanks and missile systems held by both 
alliances The importance of their contribution to the security framework of 
Europe is demonstrated by the difficulties encountered with aircraft 
reductions during the Conventional Forces m Europe (CFE) negotiation 
process While many other issues have been resolved, the fate of aircraft 
reductions, by the fall of 1990, is still vigorously argued Even after
2US/Soviet ministerial level meetings and the Bush/Gorbachev summits, 
there is significant disagreement between opposing parties on aircraft 
reductions further suggesting the importance and critical role of these forces 
within each bloc 2
The Present Course
Since 1979 NATO has reduced the total number of "tactical use" nuclear 
warheads m Europe by one-third, the current numbers are the lowest m 
twenty years 3 Even before the revolutionary changes m Europe, NATO's 
1988 "Nuclear Weapons Requirement Study 1991-1998" proposed a reduced 
nuclear arsenal of less than 3,000 warheads, a Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL), 
new 155 millimeter artillery shells, and an air-to-surface missile 4 President 
Mikhail Gorbachev committed the Soviet Union to unilateral nuclear 
weapon reductions once short-range nuclear forces (SNF) talks are formally 
initiated and has promised a unilateral 500 warhead reduction without 
negotiations 5 In 1989, the NATO Alliance agreed to bilateral SNF 
negotiations after a CFE treaty and reductions are underway Additionally, it 
was decided that modernization questions for the Lance missile system would 
be delayed until 1992
By May, 1990, modernization of FOTL and nuclear based artillery was 
cancelled, and NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), while agreeing " 
that there is a diminishing need for nuclear systems of the shortest range, ' 
and committed to "reassess the future qualitative and quantitative 
requirements" of nuclear weapons (especially short-range missiles and 
nuclear artillery) in Europe, also expressed a commitment to maintain a 
nuclear deterrent6
These pronouncements on nuclear force reductions in the region of 
the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) have occurred dunng an anfractuous 
penod, one m which the West is attempting to encourage Soviet reform, 
promote a peaceful evolution of political change in Eastern Europe, and 
support the long-standing commitment for the unification of Germany 7 
Reductions m conventional arms, some coordinated, some unilateral, create 
an ever more complicated view of the European security environment 
already fraught with issues of allied burdenshanng, a diminishing threat, and 
declining budgets that are individually and synergistically redrawing the 
European arms control picture It is a picture attempting to portray a greatly 
reduced military posture, but one with an enduring balance of military 
capabilities sufficient for defense and not sufficient for aggression
Although the probability of war is low, the capability for armed conflict 
is still very high If this potent capability were ever exercised, the forces able 
to maintain air superiority would dictate not only the overall level of air
3operations, but also exercise significant influence on the tempo and success of 
the overall theater campaign 8 Given the Intermediate-Range and Shorter- 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty (it established precedents for asymmetric 
reductions in treaty limited items and intrusive verification regimes), the 
high probability of a CFE treaty, and unilateral reduction in forces throughout 
Europe, the political importance and combat potential for the remaining 
dual-capable aircraft and SNF become even greater These developments 
make the next level of arms control negotiations particularly challenging 
(especially from a militarily strategic and tactical perspective), but with the 
potential to make significant contributions to the enhancement of stability 
and security in Europe as enormous military capabilities are sized and 
postured in-line with the professed Soviet intention of a "defensive 
defense "9
Nuclear Arms and Conventional Forces, The Arms Control Linkage
That conventional arms control measures and reductions have a significant 
impact on the role of nuclear forces m Europe is certainly not a novel concept 
Bruce George, MP (a Member of the Britain's House of Commons, Chairman 
of the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, and editor of 
Jane's NATO Handbook 1989-90), has emphasized this linkage "Given a 
lower level of threat and a negotiated balance m conventional forces the 
French and United Kingdom (UK) nuclear forces could assume a greater 
importance as a 'European deterrent '" 10 Alexei A Vasiliev, a leading figure 
at the Institute of the USA and Canada (Moscow) and special advisor to the 
CFE talks in Vienna, argues that the "role of nuclear weapons is 
strengthened" given any reduction in conventional arms, and further, this 
situation does not increase stability and even reduces the significance of any 
conventional arms reductions or agreements 11 Arnold Kantner (now on the 
staff of the National Security Council) agrees on the importance of the 
shorter-range nuclear weapons, but differs from Vasiliev on their level of 
influence m the conventional arms control process He stresses NATO's 
nuclear deterrent requirements reflect strategic and political roles beyond the 
military utility, and this makes their importance somewhat more 
independent of conventional force postures 12 Stepping beyond the nuances 
of their debate, a bottom line assessment seems to come from retired Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman, Admiral Crowe Given the Soviet economic 
problems and political reforms within Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) 
countries, Crowe, says, " the Soviets couldn't fight a conventional war, at 
least one of any duration [and] the one thing they could still do today, no 
matter what their problems are, is push the nuclear button " 13
4Intentions or Capabilities7
The idea of addressing military capability as opposed to military intentions 
generates considerable debate, especially between military oriented leaders 
and the legislative forces during debates on budget issues Secretary of 
Defense Cheney, before the Senate Budget Committee, argued
As we view what are clearly positive developments, we have a respon­
sibility to distinguish what is done from what is only promised The 
Soviet Union remains an extremely formidable military power Recent 
events, both in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself have 
decreased the risk of the Soviets launching a premeditated attack on 
Western Europe But the volatility and unpredictability of the situation 
there has, m many ways, increased the chance of an inadvertent conflict 
We must make our military adjustments with an eye toward genuine 
reductions m risks, not in anticipation of how we hope global events 
will evolve14
Moreover, one can find a similar sentiment in Europe French 
Mimster of Defense Chevènement expressed this concern when he said the 
Soviet Union will remain a great power and "states must be judged not 
according to their intentions, but according to their capabilities " 15
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), Gen 
Galvin, in Congressional testimony told US legislators
as the man responsible for the defense and deterrence m Western 
Europe from Norway around to Turkey, I cannot look at intentions of 
the Soviet Umon I have to look at the capabilities of the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact Intentions are like moods They can change 
overnight Capabilities are important It takes a long time to change 
capabilities 16
Although an opponent's intentions are essential in the overall calculus of 
deterrence, operational capability (discussed later m this paper) must be the 
focus of the military element of any national security system, and for arms 
control to be effective and contribute to national security, capabilities and 
potentialities must be reduced, moderated, or stabilized
To fully appreciate the arms control environment of European nuclear 
forces, a basic understanding of their role and capabilities is required 
Essentially, one must realize how European nuclear forces fit into a coherent 
military strategy that legitimizes these weapons and accommodates the 
political reality required for deployment To do this we now turn to the 
strategic environment found m the region de Gaulle referred to as Europe, 
Atlantic-to-the-Urals
5European Nuclear Forces, Opening Perspective
The pnnctples o f strategy are simple Their application is immensely 
difficult A strategic doctrine necessary as it may be can never be applied to 
all situations
—Robert Strausz-Hupe to the National Military-Industrial Conference
Chicago February 1958
In December, 1988, Soviet President Gorbachev addressed the United Nations 
and announced his country's intentions to make significant unilateral 
reductions m the Soviet armed forces He went on to say the remaining 
forces are to "become strictly defensive" and "maintain the country's defense 
capability at a level of reasonable and dependable sufficiency, so that no one is 
tempted to encroach upon the security of the USSR or its allies " 17 While this 
one statement is far short of a full strategy of defense, significant political 
changes and force reductions are occurring in the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and especially in Germany These 
developments not only lead military analysts to seriously doubt the capacity 
of the Soviet Umon to mount a successful surprise attack into the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG), but also suggest an impending change in Soviet 
theater nuclear doctrine Such a turnabout would mean a shift from a 
nuclear warñghtmg capability to a reduced nuclear presence and one with a 
more defensive, deterrent disposition 18
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, NATO and the United* States 
faced a much different threat from the Soviet Union and later the Warsaw 
Pact It was a threat buttressed by massive land combat forces and, notably, a 
growing Soviet nuclear potential19 In December 1967, the Defense Planning 
Committee adopted NATO's new concept of flexible response and moved 
declaratory deterrent policy away from the threat of massive retaliation 
(which deterred Warsaw Pact aggression of any form by threatening a large- 
scale nuclear counter-attack against the Soviet Union) and moved toward a 
concept stressing the deterrent potential of conventional forces and 
European-based nuclear weapons This deterrent potential keyed on the 
Alliance's ability to react, m kind, or escalate, as a military response, in order 
to prevent defeat (l e , NATO kept open the possibility of employing nuclear 
weapons first, thereby increasing the uncertainty about the time and location 
of escalation) 20
Flexible Response and Forward Defense
The document, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO 
Area," Military Committee Document 14/3 (MC 14/3), was the culmination of
6a five-year formal revision process and an even longer policy debate on the 
utility and deterrent value of massive nuclear retaliation 21 The evolutionary 
process leading to flexible response catalyzed a number of significant changes
Beyond the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military 
command structure, flexible response had, by 1968, placed an even greater 
operational significance on NATO's 7,000 nuclear warheads deployed in 
Europe 22 The idea of flexible response required strong conventional forces 
and appropriate theater and strategic nuclear weapons in order to deter all 
potential levels of aggression According to US Ambassador to NATO 
Cleveland, MC 14/3 told commanders to "provide for the employment, as 
appropriate, of one or more of direct defense, deliberate escalation, and 
general nuclear response, thus confronting the enemy with a credible threat 
of escalation response to any type of aggression below the level of a major 
nuclear attack " 23 Flexible response also provided an even tighter bond 
between the United States and Europe as most of the nuclear deterrent 
operations would be dependent on US personnel, and the possibility of 
further escalation linked the fate of Frankfurt with that of New York
Beyond the problem of defining and maintaining a state of credible 
extended deterrence, NATO endures a continuing debate on the Alliance's 
dedicated nuclear forces To resolve the dispute between the proponents of 
theater nuclear use to decisively win a European war, and those who argued 
NATO theater nuclear weapons convey an unambiguous political signal to 
the Soviets, the Nuclear Planning Group reached agreement m 1986 and 
promulgated "General Political Guidelines" for the possible use of theater- 
level nuclear weapons m the defense of the European Alliance This 
document did not modify MC 14/3, but it did unequivocally support the 
concept that nuclear weapon use by NATO must convey a clear political 
signal of Alliance resolve 24
Two other elements of NATO's military force posture, forward defense 
and follow-on forces attack, also require attention to appreciate the complexity 
of the debate over European Theater Nuclear Forces NATO's military 
planners are currently committed to forward defense, i e , defending NATO 
territory with forces on its perimeter, or at least deployable to the border The 
commitment to this defensive posture is dnven by two factors First, when 
attacked, defensive forces can retreat without being totally defeated This 
retreat gams time to recover and reconstitute forces required for a counter­
attack The problem with this arrangement is that retreat requires giving up 
German or other NATO territory, a situation politically unacceptable 
Secondly, the alliance does not have the depth of territory to relinquish in 
order to gam time for building a counter-attack 25
7FOFA, Follow-on Forces Attack, is designed to counter the WTO threat 
of an overwhelming break-through offensive
By attacking the follow-on forces before they join the offensive, NATO 
hopes to reduce them to manageable proportions and delay their 
amval at the close battle It also provides the opportunity to mass fire 
against concentrations of forces before they hit NATO's defensive line, 
thereby compensating, at least m part, for NATO's inability to shift its 
ground forces m response 26
Although the specific size and appropnate force structure necessary to execute 
this strategy are contentious topics, MC 14/3 is still fully supported by the 
Alliance Both the 1989 NATO "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control 
and Disarmament," and SACEUR General John Galvm, are fully committed 
to keeping "flexible response" the cornerstone of NATO strategy As 
expressed by General Galvm
Strategy is always changing, m some form or degree When we make 
decisions as to resources—how much of a force to have, where to put it, 
how to equip it, and at what level to budget it—we are making decisions 
that affect strategy All of these have been part of the political process of 
the West throughout the entire life span of NATO This political process 
will continue to adapt It is more a question of degree than of 
departure 27
Even in this time of turbulent military force structure planning, 
General Galvm argues for the importance of maintaining flexible military 
capability He highlights having the aircraft and missile capability to attack 
reinforcement avenues, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR)/Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) railroad transloadmg zones, roads, 
other railways, and nuclear forces, m order to " assure yourself—and 
transmit to the enemy—that you are not about to lose cohesion on the 
battlefield, and you'll use nuclear weapons if you have to "28
Despite the firm commitment to Flexible Response and Forward 
Defense, neither concept seems militarily or politically feasible in the near 
future, especially given the combination of unilateral alliance and CFE driven 
force reductions Even General Galvm has conceded force reductions beyond 
CFE would force significant changes m NATO planning 29 Although it is 
unlikely the remaining conventional capability of NATO or the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization would allow for a quick offensive, it is also unlikely 
NATO will have the m-place forces to maintain its current "layer-cake " 
alignment of multinational corporation responsibilities along the (soon to be 
changing) inter-German border These force reductions, driven by a lessening 
military threat, popular demands for a less provocative military posture, 
economic, and demographic trends, lend one to envision the rejection of, or 
significant change m NATO's Flexible Response strategy 30
8The Future Tasks of the Alliance
Besides MC 14/3, 1967 yielded another document that continues as a 
significant source for NATO guidance The Harmel Report, titled "The 
Future Tasks of the Alliance," stressed two functions for the Alliance The 
first was "to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to 
deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of 
member countries if aggression should occur " The second function was 
dnven by the inherent instability and uncertainty found m Europe, and the 
crisis potential of the "central political issues m Europe, first and foremost the 
German Question " 31 The Harmel Report also stressed the importance of 
concurrently pursuing, "the search for progress towards a more stable 
relationship m which the underlying political issues can be solved Military 
security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary " 32 
These key passages were invoked by the Alliance during 1989 in their 
"Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament " With this 
document, NATO reiterated its commitment to "arms control as an integral 
part of the Alliance's security policy " 33
Also in this document, which centers on NATO's concept of arms 
control, one finds important pronouncements on the purpose and function 
(and, as noted earlier, the extremely political nature) of theater nuclear 
weapons
Conventional defense alone cannot, however, ensure deterrence 
Only the nuclear element can confront an aggressor with an 
unacceptable nsk and thus play an indispensable role in our current 
strategy of war prevention
The fundamental purpose of nuclear forces is political to 
preserve the peace and to prevent any kind of war Such forces 
contribute to deterrence by demonstrating that the Allies have the 
military capability and the political will to use them, if necessary, m 
response to aggression Should aggression occur, the aim would be to 
restore deterrence by inducing the aggressor to reconsider his decision, to 
terminate his attack and to withdraw and thereby to restore the 
territorial integrity of the Alliance
Nuclear forces below the strategic level ensure that there 
are no circumstances m which a potential aggressor might 
discount the prospect of nuclear retaliation in response to military 
action thus [they] make an essential contribution to 
deterrence 34
This emphasis on the political purpose for nuclear forces is also 
highlighted in Air Force Basic Doctrine (Air Force Manual 1-1) and the 1986
9Army Operations (FM 100-5) Manual In discussing forms of warfare, AFM 11 
states, "National policy and objectives will guide the use of nuclear weapons 
rather than the tactical effect a particular employment might produce " As 
expressed by FM 100-5
Even though the primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their 
use by others, the threat of nuclear escalation pervades any military 
operation involving the armies of nuclear powers US nuclear 
weapons may of course only be used following specific directives by the 
National Command Authorities (NCA) after appropriate consultation 
with allies Even were such authority granted, however, the 
employment of nuclear weapons would be guided more by political and 
strategic objectives than by the tactical effect a particular authorized 
employment might produce 35
One must keep m mind that while the aggressor must consider nuclear 
escalation or retaliation as possible responses, NATO's "initial decision to use 
nuclear weapons would be excruciatingly difficult and made only after careful 
considerations," especially as the SNF and battlefield weapons force allied 
decision-makers contemplate their use on NATO territory 36
NATO's political direction on nuclear forces was further defined at the 
close of the July 1990 meeting of the North Atlantic Council Drawing on the 
"prospects of further changes" and the "total withdrawal of Soviet stationed 
forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can 
reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons "37
The French Deterrent
Before turning to the description of European Nuclear Force capabilities, a 
short summary of French nuclear thinking is appropriate In addition to 
Alliance nuclear forces, France maintains a full range of nuclear capabilities 
outside of the integrated NATO military structure The French longer-range 
systems, especially the Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)s, are the 
foundation of France's deterrent defense policy and force posture French 
shorter-range forces ("pre-strategic" as described by the French) link with the 
longer-range forces to form a small, but versatile force These "pre-strategic" 
forces perform an ultime avertissement (a last warning) mission, m NATO 
parlance they might be described as conflict escalation controls
Although French nuclear forces (summarized in the next section of 
this paper) are experiencing qualitative expansion m order to meet their 
entena of sufficiency, it is still a force whose command and control system 
does not truly support any extended nuclear operations or warfighting 
capability Therefore, employment is likely characterized as a "signal-barrage 
doctnne" that is credible and makes the French forces a true "wild card" (also 
desenbed as a "free agent") m the nuclear balance of power m Europe 38 As
10
detailed by Jerome Paolini, French nuclear doctrine is not a true form of 
"massive retaliation" nor of "flexible response "
French nuclear strategy rejects both concepts Nuclear use is to be 
initiated as a test of the aggressor's will to jeopardize France's vital 
interests—not strictly defined as the country's national territory—in the 
form of a once-and-for-all last warning counterforce "pre-strategic7 
strike, opemng the way to subsequent full-blown strategic escalation 
directly on the adversary's sanctuary The strategy thus explicitly rejects 
fighting a prolonged conventional or nuclear battle in favor of 
minimum, yet sufficient deterrence, strictly oriented towards conflict 
prevention All French nuclear forces are thus understood to be of a 
strategic nature, hence the use of the term "pre-strategic" for what might 
otherwise be considered theater or tactical weapons 39
In an arms control context, one must address the fact, France is a nation with 
a strong national commitment to nuclear forces and weapons programs 40
France's independent nuclear policies and national commitment to 
remain outside the integrated military structure of NATO hold some 
potential to complicate future European nuclear forces arms control efforts 
However, France's active participation and support during the CFE 
negotiations show a willingness to engage the arms control process as a 
means to shape security concerns, and further, this suggests France's 
participation m the inevitable arms control negotiation over European 
nuclear forces, probably addressing the short-range battlefield weapons This 
potential participation does not go so far as to suggest an attitude like that 
found m the German decision to remove their Pershing LA missiles as part of 
the INF treaty, even though the negotiations were strictly dealing with US 
and the Soviet missile systems 41 More specific French attitudes on European 
nuclear forces and arms control are discussed in a later section,
Modernization and Disarmament
Given that a significant reduction in theater nuclear forces in Europe is 
inevitable, it is necessary to have a concept of the forces involved and their 
military and political utility This discussion cannot be limited to just US and 
Soviet forces With the reduction of the US nuclear presence m Europe will 
come a shift in the burden of deterrence to British and French nuclear forces 
To appreciate the British and French potential for a greater role in the 
European nuclear equation, one must also examine the current capabilities of 
these nuclear weapon systems and how they flt into the NATO deterrence 
paradigm
11
Nuclear Forces—Atlantic-to-the-Urals Capabilities
Vie must consult our means rather than our wishes and not endeavor to better 
our affairs by attempting things which for want of success may make them 
worse
—George Washington to Lafayette 1780
These forces go by many names Among arms control cognoscenti, there are 
tactical weapons with ranges of 150-500 kilometers or battlefield weapons 
having ranges from 0-150km The INF Treaty differentiates between shorter- 
range nuclear missiles (500-1,000 kilometers) and intermediate-range missiles 
(1,000-5,500 kilometers) Adding to the lexicon of these European nuclear 
forces, are US, British, and French "strategic" systems, and French "pre or sub- 
strategic" forces For our purpose those weapon systems dedicated to the 
theater, planned for use m Europe, and controlled by NATO or the Warsaw 
Pact, without consideration of potential range, will be addressed, for if we 
limit our focus to weapon system's ranges, an overly simplified picture of the 
European nuclear forces would emerge 42
Western Forces
Throughout the Alliance one fmds a variety of aír-, land-, and sea-based 
systems These systems include dual-capable fighter aircraft (land and earner- 
based), some with all-weather capability and extended range capacity, and 
other systems with marginal night-time/adverse weather capabilities and 
having rather "short legs " Dual-capable aircraft (DCA) gamer this classifying 
identification by their ability to deliver either conventional or nuclear 
munitions As the INF Treaty eliminates an entire class of missile systems, it 
is the DCA providing NATO with the preponderance of its capability to 
deliver weapons beyond the immediate battlefield 43
In the longer-range area all-weather category, NATO employs US 
F -llls  forward based in the UK and Tomado GR1 strike aircraft m the UK and 
the FRG With the addition of a small number of F-15Es (a newer, two-seat, 
long-range interdiction fighter-bomber version of the F-15) and F-16s 
eqmpped with Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night 
(LANTIRN), NATO will greatly expand its mght and adverse weather 
operational capability 44 It is the F-16s and old F-104s of Greece, Turkey, 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and forward based US F-16s (such as those of 
the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, Torrejon, Spam) that round out the 
Alliance's shorter-range dual-capable aircraft
Carner based stnke forces include the Mediterranean-based US 6th 
Fleet (470 aircraft a notational potential), sixty-four French Super Etendard, 
and forty-six Bntish Hamer jump jets Despite perceived advantages of
12
earner-based aircraft (e g , operations independent of bases on foreign soil), a 
significant disadvantage of these earner-based nuclear capable aircraft is their 
vulnerability and lack of efficacious deterrent effect To be the least bit 
credible, carrier-based aircraft drive the earner into an increasingly vulnerable 
position (where they could be at nsk from Air-Launched Continental Missiles 
[ALCM] equipped Soviet bombers) m order to launch the strike forces 
Beyond this disadvantage, earner-based aircraft are subject to the same 
competing mission requirements of land-based DCA
Excluding missile systems eliminated under the INF Treaty, NATO's 
land-based missile systems (all short-range systems) include thirty-six US 
Lance launchers and fifty-eight Lance launchers controlled by other NATO 
countries (fifty-two of these launchers m the ATTU) For these ninety-four 
launchers, there are an estimated 690 missiles available to US and non-US 
NATO Lance launchers 45 Lance missiles are intended as a corps level 
weapon system enabling commanders to hold at nsk, deep battlefield targets
Although not a part of the integrated NATO military targeting and 
command structure, France maintains eighteen intermediate range, silo- 
based missiles, and thirty-two battlefield level missile systems, all nuclear 
equipped 46 These systems will be detailed when French nuclear forces are 
discussed
To address the threat in the immediate battlefield, the Alliance strategy 
of flexible response relies on nuclear-capable artillery These forces "deny the 
enemy a sanctuary to mass forces behmd the immediate battle zone and 
provide the capability to break the momentum of an offensive "47 They 
consist of a new 8-mch (203 millimeter) artillery-fire atomic projectile (AFAP) 
with longer range, greater safety and accuracy, and 155 millimeter artillery 
shells It should be noted that there is a 1984 congressional mandated limit of 
925 on the number of new 155/203 millimeter AFAPs that can be produced 
which does restrict the level of modernization to the artillery forces 48
Sea-based systems consist of sixty-four (non-multiple independently 
targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)) UK submanne launched ballistic missiles 
(Polans A3-TK Chevaline) with an estimated range of 4,700 km (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) lists two warheads with 40 kT 
yields while International Institute of Strategic Studies (ESS) lists 3 multiple 
re-entry vehicles of 200 kT yield) The British Chevaline warhead systems 
include penetration aids to counter the Moscow "Galosh" antiballistic missile 
system It should be noted that these SLBM weapons, and all Bntish nuclear 
forces, are "assigned to NATO but controlled by Britain, and can be employed 
independently when supreme national interests are at stake " 49 Other 
systems include 400 US SLBM warheads dedicated to the SACEUR m support 
of NATO's General Strike Plan 50 Their utility to the NATO deterrent efforts 
is likely limited to 'general" rather than "selective" release as their execution
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execution reveals the location of the submarine and presents a picture to the 
Soviets that is difficult to distinguish from a strategic attack This would 
certainly hamper any effort to control escalation, and very selective or limited 
strikes with eight (100 kT) or ten warhead (40-50 kT) missiles seems 
farfetched (This does not seem to be a problem with the French SLBM force- 
de-frappe given their declared policy of strategic response with a countervalue 
rather than counterforce targeting )
French Nuclear Forces
France's independent nuclear forces contribute to their concept of 
"proportional deterrence" developed by General Pierre Gallois and implicitly 
endorsed by de Gaulle in 1964 This level of deterrence is based on the idea 
that Moscow would not risk the potential destruction of Soviet cities by the 
French forces for whatever gam the Soviets might think to obtain by the 
conquest of France
French land-based air forces account for approximately 90 to 95 nuclear 
weapons delivered by their four strike aircraft systems assigned to the strategic 
air forces, Forces Aériennes Stratégiques (FAS), and the prestrategic fighters 
assigned to the Force Aérienne Tactique (FATAC) Among these aircraft are 
approximately eighteen Dassault-Breguet Mirage IVP long-range fighter 
bombers modified to carry the French nuclear air-to-surface stand-off missile, 
Air-Sol, Moyenne-Portee (ASMP)51 French shorter-range systems (grouped 
m a category the French describe as "sub-strategic" or "prestrategic") include 
the Mirage 2000N (a two-seat all-weather fighter with terrain-following radar) 
and Mirage HIE fighters, the former equipped to carry the ASMP and the latter 
limited to gravity weapons, AN-52 variable yield bombs A sign the French 
are also subject to the changes in the security environment, can be found in 
their decision to eliminate two of the five "sub-strategic" strike squadrons 
previously scheduled for upgrades to the more capable Mirage 2000N and the 
ASMP nuclear air-to-surface missile This move will accommodate 
continuing modernization of other French nuclear forces 52 Also included m 
the French sub-strategic arsenal are over forty carrier-based Super Etendard 
aircraft equipped to deliver the ASMP 53
Land-based nuclear forces are assigned to both the FAS and the Army 
The FAS control of eighteen S-3D intermediate range missiles (approximately 
3500km) equipped with single warheads (one megaton estimated yield)
These missiles, designed, developed, and produced by France, are silo-based 
and located on the Albion Plateau m southeastern France France currently 
deploys the battlefield level missile system, Pluton, which has a 120 km range 
and a single 10/25 kT fission warhead 54 The Pluton's tracked carriers are 
divided among four artillery regiments stationed in northern and 
northeastern France, and are under corps-level command 55
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France's sea-based deterrent forces belong to the Force Océanique 
Stratégique (FOST) and consist of six nuclear powered submarines (one M-4 
equipped boat currently being overhauled) with each boat carrying sixteen 
missiles This fleet, operating from lile Longue in Brittany, cames thirty-two 
M-20 submanne launched ballistic missiles (equipped with single, one MT 
warheads with an estimated range of 5,000 km) and forty-eight M-4 SLBMs 
(six multiple, independently targeted warheads, with 150 kT yields and 
estimated 6,000 km range)56
Eastern Forces
The European theater nuclear forces have a somewhat different character 
than the Alliance There is certainly less emphasis on SLBM forces, and 
when compared to NATO, a far greater number of short-range, land-based 
systems are held by the Warsaw Pact Even when French launchers are 
included in the Alliance totals, Warsaw Treaty published figures show an 11 8 
to 1 Pact advantage m "tactical missile launch systems west of the Ural 
Mountains " 57 The Soviet theater forces, especially battlefield and short-range 
nuclear systems, hold at risk much of NATO's critical command, control, and 
communications capability, airfields, and weapons With the INF Treaty, 
however, the bulk of the "quick-strike" weapons that threaten these critical 
NATO forces (and WTO forces) are being removed
Nuclear capable missiles systems, after the INF Treaty eliminations, 
consist of Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG), Scuds, and SS-21s National 
numbers for ATTU missile systems are over 1,200 launchers m the Soviet 
Union and under 400 in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, with the numbers 
decreasing in the NSWP 58 Older, less accurate FROG forces have been 
continually upgraded to SS-21 systems (120 km versus 70 km range of FROG) 
and reorganized into brigades under Army level control m order to take 
advantage of the faster launch times, increased reliability of the system, and 
more centralized control59
In the artillery area, there are more contentious assessments The ESS 
reports a slight Pact advantage in "theoretically nuclear-capable [artillery] 
weapons" in the Atlanüc-to-the-Urals region (5517 Warsaw Pact to 5209 
NATO artillery pieces) while Soviet Military Power 1989 reports a 41 Pact 
advantage in the ATTU 60 The Western European Union reports a Warsaw 
Pact advantage that has developed in the 1980s, the Warsaw Pact with 3,800 
dual-capable systems between 152 and 240 mm versus 1,200 NATO 155 mm or 
203 mm artillery systems 61 With the CFE treaty, reductions m nuclear- 
capability is inevitable, yet the prospects of the CFE process ameliorating the 
debate on aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles are dim
15
The WTO does not have any forces equivalent m European character 
to the SACEUR 400 warheads or the French and British SLBM forces With 
the announcement by Gorbachev to remove the Golf II submarines from the 
Baltic Sea, the closest equivalent to a European committed SLBM for the 
WTO was eliminated 62
Aircraft Systems and Air Power
As with NATO, the WTO maintains a robust theater level dual-capable 
aircraft force The Soviet Union's dual capable aircraft (DCA) work m concert 
with the conventional air operations to destroy enemy aircraft both on the 
ground and m the air, dispersal airfields and mam operating bases, 
operational and tactical level missile systems, command and control facilities, 
and weapon storage areas (both conventional and nuclear) This goal, at the 
operational level, as with NATO, is to maintain control of the air, i e , air 
superiority, in order to provide direct and indirect support to ground 
operations as part of the "all-services" war From the Soviet perspective, air 
operations must address the element of NATO that carnes approximately 50 
percent of NATO's firepower, the Alliance's air force 63
Like NATO, the size of the Warsaw Pact's dual-capable aircraft 
inventory will probably not be significantly affected by CFE reductions until 
the older and/or more specialized aircraft are destroyed m accordance with 
the expected treaty The Warsaw Pact has 360 Tu-16 Badgers, Tu-22 Blinders 
and Tu-22m Backfires (excluding approximately 230 aircraft dedicated to naval 
missions) These aircraft need to be considered theater threats despite their 
inability to fly the low profile missions of NATO F -llls  or Tomados or the 
Pact's Su-24 Fencers Although these larger systems are vulnerable to current 
surveillance systems and interceptors with standoff missiles, these systems 
make significant contributions to the Soviet capability of holding European 
targets at risk from bases well within Soviet national territory
This shift to standoff nuclear missiles for the larger platforms has also 
occurred in the Su-24 Fencer DCA This fighter is capable of greater than 
24,000 lb payloads of nuclear weapons and a wide range of Soviet air-to- 
surface missiles (e g , AS-7 Kerry, AS-10 Karen, AS-11 Kilter, AS-12 Kegler [an 
anti-radiation missile for defense suppression] AS-13 Kingbolt, the US 
Maverick-like AS-14 Kedge, and possibly a new nuclear-tipped air-to-surface 
missile, the AS-16 Kickback) 64 Besides this stand-off missile capability, an 
increasing number of Fencer aircraft (approximately 500 total Fencers 
deployed) are gaining air refueling capability Additionally, the Soviet Umon 
has placed these aircraft under a more centrally controlled structure, 
specifically "into VGK-subordmate air armies which enhances 
responsiveness and the ability of the system to meet theater requirements" 
especially deep-interdiction capability 65
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Besides an appreciation of weapons capability, knowledge as to the 
employment schemes of forces is necessary throughout the arms control 
process This knowledge contributes to a more effective negotiation process 
(if, that is, the process is not inundated with esoteric background issues meant 
to block progress in talks) and ensures the ultimate security of each 
negotiating party if not unduly compromised This knowledge of capabilities 
and employment schemes reminds the arms control process of its potential 
central role m shaping and influencing the future definition of stability, 
security concepts, and force structure in Europe, at both a domestic and 
international level Even more specifically, this process must attempt to 
accommodate, and possibly sculpt, the force structure required to defend 
(NATO or the Warsaw Treaty Organization) against evolving "defensive" 
military doctrines and associated force structures
Air Power—East and West
One can use the air forces of each alliance as a paradigm to exemplify this 
critical element of the arms control process First, examining the doctrine and 
employment capabilities potential for each alliance, it is evident that while 
both air forces are organized and tend to place different emphasis on certain 
missions, the fundamental goals of both alliance air forces have been similar 
At the center of their air campaign's "operational art" are the missions of 
counter-air, air interdiction, and offensive air support66
There are numerous Western documents explaining these missions 
and their role in combined forces operations NATO's airpower focuses on 
maintaining air superiority and supporting the ground/theater campaign in 
both a short-warning and prolonged crisis/mobilization scenano NATO's 
tactical level airpower takes advantage of its inherent charactenstics (speed, 
range, concentration of firepower, and flexibility) to accomplish missions 
common throughout NATO s Tactical Air Doctrine, US Army Operations 
(Field Manual 100-5), and Air Force Basic Doctrine (US Air Force Manual 1-1) 
These missions require operations that yield air supenonty and stop an 
enemy offensive by attacking not only the "forces in contact, but enemy forces 
held m reserve " 67
Borrowing NATO Tactical Air Doctrine verbiage, the arms control 
process is likely more concerned with offensive and defensive counter air 
operations and the air operations against enemy surface assets than with what 
NATO describes as tactical transport and supporting air operations (e g , air 
refueling, search and rescue, electronic warfare, and suppression of enemy air 
defense) Offensive counter-air operations attempt to destroy, disrupt, and 
limit enemy airpower as close to its source as possible Defensive counter-air 
attempts to reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action that threaten friendly
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forces/installations These counter-air missions stress the advantage of 
destroying enemy air forces on the ground before they can be a hostile, 
airborne threat, but at the same time these missions are moderated by 
political considerations These political considerations enter the airpower 
employment scheme equation as planning factors addressing the potential 
provocative nature of the attacks, e g , could a particular mission lead to an 
inadvertent attack on the enemy's tactical nuclear capability and 
unintentionally escalate the conflict68
However, these counter-air missions might be moderated by political 
considerations, their importance to establishing air superiority is in no way 
diminished The side possessing air superiority has the freedom to execute all 
other ground and air operations without fear of significant interference by 
hostile air forces Conversely, without air supenonty the theater campaign 
will certainly face interdiction type attacks limiting maneuver potential and 
overall effectiveness of both forward and reserve forces/supplies
Once air supenonty is established, prosecution of an effective air 
campaign against enemy surface assets can begin This element of the 
campaign will focus on destroying, delaying, or neutralizing an enemy's 
military potential before, and/or, after it enters the battle area The location of 
the targets (whether they are outside the battle area, inside the battle area but 
not in direct contact, or combat forces m direct contact) dnves the level of 
operational air forces /ground forces coordination and integration 69
Although the Warsaw Treaty Organization air forces are most certainly 
experiencing changes in their doctrine necessary to accommodate a defensive 
posture (for the Soviet Umon, one capable of repelling an aggressor without 
the advantage of "buffer states"), they have traditionally stressed the 
importance of airpower m carrying through an initial attack and maintaining 
the "frontal" size offensive As with NATO, the "air supremacy" mission is 
critical, but the support of ground theater operations is also an essential 
element of the air forces' charter and focuses on battlefield air interdiction 
(BAI), Close Air Support (CAS), and tactical reconnaissance, according to 
traditional Soviet doctrine (and until the new defensive doctrine is 
developed and forces employed opposing military forces and arms control 
processes that must also address the older, traditional doctrines) as described 
by National Defense University consultant Ted Greenwood
any Warsaw Pact military offensive m Europe would be initiated by 
an air operation employing Soviet medium-range ground-attack aircraft, 
their escorts, and probably short-range ballistic missiles armed with 
conventional or perhaps chemical warheads The attacking aircraft 
would include, most importantly, Backfires and Fencers, but also Badgers 
and Blinders, belonging to the Soviet air armies under control of the 
Supreme High Command, frontal aviation, and possibly also Soviet 
naval aviation Preparation for such an air operation could be faster
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and less obvious than preparation for ground attack Moreover, if fully 
successful, it would cripple NATO's airpower and area air defense 
capability, eliminate NATO's theater nuclear assets, disrupt its command 
and control, and significantly impede its mobilization for war NATO's 
conventional and nuclear capability would be gravely jeopardized 
Soviet medium-range ground-attack aircraft and their escorts, therefore, 
pose the most urgent and the most serious element of the traditional 
short-warning or surprise attack threat to NATO 70
The importance of airpower to the Soviets is further expressed by Dennis 
Gormley
Changing force ratios on the ground are surely reason for concern But 
they have drawn so much analytic and emotional attention m the West 
as to overshadow an equally or perhaps even more important feature (in 
the Soviet view) of the initial period that of the air war Put simply, 
Soviet military planners calculate that success on the ground—tank 
asymmetries notwithstanding—cannot happen without decisive success 
first in the air 71
The Soviet Union and NATO maintain potent medium-range ground 
attack/strike aircraft The Soviets employ Badgers, Blinders, Backfires, and 
especially Fencers, while the West relies heavily on F -llls  and the GR-1 
Tornado supplemented by shorter-range F-16s and the French Mirage IVs 
These aircraft provide offensive counter-air, deep interdiction, and nuclear 
strike capability Despite ail-power's significant offensive potential in Europe's 
military balance, and recalling the mandated objectives of the Conventional 
Forces m Europe negotiations to
strengthen stability and security m Europe through the 
establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed 
forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, at lower 
levels, the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security, 
and the elimination, as a matter of priority, of the capability for 
launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action 72
It seems unlikely that a negotiated reduction in nuclear strike capability will 
occur Current CFE proposals allow reductions without necessarily reducing 
strike aircraft, and although major combat capability rests with ground force, 
the importance and potential impact of airpower (especially the DCA) on the 
dynamics of a military confrontation (or the military balance) suggests their 
inclusion, if not now in the CFE, then certainly in the next round of 
negotiations addressing nuclear forces in Europe
At this juncture it is appropriate to shift the discussion to the direction 
taken by the current European nuclear forces Just what are the 
modernization efforts and what are the potential constraints on NATO 
deployment options for US, British, and French nuclear weapons in Western 
Europe in the wake of the denuclearization wave7
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deployment options for US, British, and French nuclear weapons m Western 
Europe m the wake of the denuclearization wave7
Building Up or Building Down?
The Politics of Modernization and Disarmament
In arriving at this decision and resolving not to go to war the Lacadaemonians 
were influenced not so much by the speeches of their allies as by the fear of 
the Athenians and their increased power
—Thucydides History of the PeloponnestanWars c 404 B C
Modernization Between Scylla and Charybdis
To compliment the discussion on current capabilities, a survey of 
modernization proposals and efforts is needed to appreciate the approaching 
arms control potential of European nuclear forces and the political 
vanables/dnvers of the NATO nuclear program By the summer of 1989, 
NATO's debate on the direction of modernization for its nuclear forces 
seemed resolved by the "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and 
Disarmament " This declaration established a direction and time table for 
modernization, and firmly linked hardware improvements to a reduction m 
total weapon numbers By the fall of 1990, this position had been assaulted by 
toppling governments m Eastern Europe, a significant reduction in the 
WTO's military potential, souvenir fragments of the Berlin Wall (some 
having traveled into the central US), and the impending unification of 
Germany All of these events reflect the changes in the military character of 
what remains of the Warsaw Pact Despite valiant attempts to maintain this 
dual-track methodology (modernize in order to reduce), reductions without 
modernization seem inevitable
As to the specific modernization efforts, NATO originally programmed 
improvements for the entire range of nuclear capabilities The upgrade for 
the DCA included the addition of F-15E strike aircraft and LANTIRN 
equipped F-16s 73 Although DCA systems may be qualitatively improved, 
quantitative expansion to compensate for a loss of ground-based INF systems 
is not likely, especially given the decreasing threat and potential CFE 
mandated reductions
To lend further credibility to the deterrent capacity of DCA, NATO is 
pressing forward with a nuclear tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) The 
US air-launched Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM-T), conceptually similar 
to the current French ASMP, is under development Receiving $54 million 
m FY 90 with $118 6 million requested for FY 91, the SRAM-T (equipped with 
the W91 warhead said to incorporate two potential yields of 10 kt or 100 kt) 
gives the DCA a stand-off capability to attack targets more quickly from a less
20
threatening environment, and to strike hardened or relocatable targets at 
ranges greater than 250 km 74 The SRAM-T is a strong contender for NATO's 
DCA and as a potential replacement (in competition with the ASLP, Air-Sol 
Longue Portée, a 1,000 to 1,200 km range derivative of the current French 
medium range air-to-surface missile, ASMP) for Britain's obsolescent WEI 77 
gravity bombs 75 However, TASM deployment is still years away According 
to officials at the US Air Force's Aeronautical Systems Division, delivery of 
operational SRAM-Ts to F-15E umts m the US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) 
currently are not scheduled until the second quarter of 1995, and at the rate of 
changes in the political environment surrounding nuclear weapons 
procurement and planning, much can happen by 1995 76
Despite potential controversy, the SRAM-T seems to have the longest 
half-life Even m this semester of denuclearization both sides of the issue 
show support (or at least no vigorous opposition) for an air-launched system 
with the necessary range allowing strikes on the Russian homeland Within 
the US, air-launched systems have broad political endorsement Besides the 
US Executive and NATO level support for deploying the shorter-range 
(shorter than say, the Air Launched Cruise Missile being negotiated m the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START)]) missile launched from aircraft, 
Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, also argues 
for the air launched nuclear system, especially as a bargaining chip to 
accompany the removal of land-based systems in Germany "Air-delivered 
weapons allow significantly greater flexibility for military planners, permit 
basing of nuclear capabilities m several NATO countries, and do not pose the 
significant security and political problems that accompany systems that have a 
far more limited range 77 A general NATO consensus on the TASM seems 
to exist "Military officials and experts say NATO leaders likely will approve a 
plan to replace the Lance follow-on with TASM because the air-launched 
missile is less visible, both politically and physically " Despite this statement, 
TASM deployment in Germany is still in question 78 One of the "assurances" 
President Bush made to President Gorbachev during the May 1990 summit on 
the issue of German unification, provided for a West German reaffirmation 
of "its long-stated commitment not to produce or possess nuclear, 
biological,or chemical weapons " Acknowledging the concern over 
unification and the politically sensitive issue of nuclear weapons based in 
Germany, the FRG's Foreign Mimster Hans-Dietnch Genscher has already 
stated TASM cannot be deployed m Germany, but air-delivered nuclear 
gravity bombs would be permitted to serve as a nuclear deterrent based on 
German soil79
Until May 1990, ground based modernization was centered on missiles 
with ranges less than 500 km (to comply with the INF Treaty and expand 
and/or enlarge the missile capability available to a corps level commander) 
and battlefield artillery The Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) was planned with 
increased range and reliability so as to hold a wider range of targets at risk
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(e g-, echeloning forces) while at the same time being farther from the forward 
edge of battle The FOTL coupled with safer, more reliable, longer-ranged 
artillery would have, even without a negotiated arms control agreement, 
allowed reduction m the number of European deployed artillery shells 
Programmed improvements for artillery systems (limited to 925 worldwide 
by a Congressional restriction) stressed increased range (doubling the 155 mm 
range to approximately 30 km), reliability, accuracy, and safety
The US endorsement for a FOTL was not unanimous Before a very 
skeptical US Congress, SACEUR General Galvin argued FOTL's virtues and 
importance to NATO nuclear modernization plans FOTL provides the 
capability to attack movmg or stationary targets with the SRAM-T 
emphasizing holding at nsk stationary targets, and General Galvm rejected a 
force posture emphasizing air-launched weapons as negatively impacting 
NATO deterrent capability He dismissed that posture because potential 
nuclear strike aircraft operate from about twenty easily targeted air bases in 
Europe and still face air defenses which make strike missions "the toughest 
mission that there is for a pilot today m Europe " 80 He went on to argue that 
while popular support for ground-based systems in the FRG is particularly 
contentious
The Germans want to be in NATO, and they want to be part of the 
strategy, and they want to be a decision-maker when it comes to nuclear 
weapons And if it [the FRG] doesn't stay on the team, it might be a 
little hard to stay m on all the decisions 81
Despite these arguments, the US Army Missile Command was soon 
directed not to issue a final request for proposals from contractors for the 
FOTL This was followed, approximately two weeks later, by President Bush's 
decision (endorsed by NATO) terminating the FOTL and European nuclear 
artillery modernization This action strongly suggests the political 
environment m Europe is being addressed by Washington and signals a shift 
toward a less intrusive nuclear presence (e g , DCA and Sea Launched 
Continental Missile [SLCM], one with a deterrent potential but without being 
an intrusive political irritant to NATO governments 82
The initial Eastern response to President Bush's proposal was warmly 
received, but not without some reservations TASS military analyst,
Vladimir Boyachev, wrote
The Soviet Umon welcomes Washington's decision to accept, at long 
last, the Soviet proposal on talks on nuclear tactical weapons Let us 
hope that, accepting m principle the Soviet proposal on talks on tactical 
nuclear weapons and suspending the modernization of land missiles 
and nuclear artillery, Washington does not intend at the same time to 
give a go-ahead for the deployment of more dangerous air-based nuclear 
missiles m Western Europe 83
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This response focusing on the weapons, does not fully illustrate the 
complexity of the linkage between weapons and political changes m Europe 
A more blunt characterization of the European nuclear forces modernization 
and arms control debate is expressed by a senior State Department official 
saying, "Only m the most remote sense is this a military discussion It is 
basically a political question about anchoring a unified Germany to Western 
Europe "84
The longer-range/strategic European nuclear forces seem to endure less 
political conflict, but are certainly not issue free Modernization of European 
"strategic" systems focus on SLBMs Britain is driving for a new class of 
Vanguard hulls (four total with two under construction, the Vanguard and 
Victorious, and a third, the Vigilant, to be ordered m 1990) equipped with 
sixteen Trident D5 missiles (regularly attributed with eight warheads when 
deployed accordmg to Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and START 
countmg rules) These 512 MIRV warheads (150 to 600 kt) are a significant 
increase from their current 128 (40 kt) Chevaline warheads, which are not 
each independently targetable
The requirement of four nuclear submarines has long been established 
by the British Ministry of Defense as the minimum necessary force to ensure 
one "boat" on patrol to maintain an "acceptable level of deterrence " As in 
1988 after the INF Treaty, 1990 has seen dialogue between French and British 
officials on coordinating nuclear policy The results, so far, have prompted a 
British "review of options," and among the options being considered is the 
cancellation of the fourth British Vanguard class submarine British officials 
are also examining the potential of coordinating targeting assignments and 
patrol schedules for French and British nuclear powered submarine (SSBN)s, 
and evaluating how this integration might eliminate the need for the fourth 
British SSBN The potential for further British and French cooperation m 
this area of military affairs may be reflected m Prime Mimster Margaret 
Thatcher's statement during a joint news conference with President Francois 
Mitterrand following President Bush's announcement on the FOTL 
cancellation, "As independent nuclear deterrent powers we feel we should 
cooperate more closely on security and defense matters ',8S Beyond these 
discussions, current UK government policy (based on the 1990 "Defense 
White Paper") is to contìnue replacement of the Polaris SLBM system with 
new SSBNs and the Tndent missile 86
The French missile refit program is moving forward with five of six 
SSBNs being eqmpped with the MIRV M4 (six warheads per missile)
Current plans call for the first two Le Triomphant class SSBNs to be equipped 
with M-4 missiles (six MIRV warheads) and the third and subsequent boats 
would carry the twelve warhead M-5 SLBM 87
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The upgrades to the intermediate range, silo-based, system on the 
Albion Plateau (a new S4 missile) no longer receive the priority resources so 
that the sea-based systems can stay on track | in this time, even for France, of 
tight defense budgets 88
France's new Hadès missile system is I programmed to replace the 
Pluton regiments by 1992 This 500 km range surface-to-surface tactical 
nuclear missile will maintain the capability Ito support the French deterrent 
concept of the "prestrategic strike " With a variable yield warhead that will be 
limited to 80 kt and a range just under the INF Treaty limits, the Hadès will 
be deployed, beginning in 1992, as a division consisting of three regiments, 
each with five batteries for a total of sixty launchers The first regiment is to 
be activated at Suippes m northeastern Frante followed by a regiment
will be disguised to resemble a 
each launcher capable of firing
garrisoned in Mailly The launcher systems 
typical European transport semi-trailer with
two missiles equipped with the variable yield TN90 warhead France still 
insists there will be no significant change m the deployment of this system 
and no chance it will come under the umbrella of any arms reduction 
discussions, but, according to a late 1989 report from the French Senate's 
defense committee, the deployment of the third regiment is under review 89 
Despite the solid French stand, the Soviet Umon is continuing to press for 
early "SNF" negotiations to include the French short-range nuclear weapons, 
a proposal not likely endorsed by the Alliance 90
Reductions and Disarmament7
With the "Gramm-Rudmann-Hollings-Gorbachev" driven budget, and 
changing European environment, it is almost certain the Alliance's earlier 
modernization goals will not be realized An increase m the number of DCA 
is doubtful, although there is the possibility of older systems being removed 
and replaced by newer, more capable systems, e g , F-104s replaced by F-16s 
President Bush's cancellation of European nuclear artillery modernization 
and the FOTL are but the first in a senes of steps to significantly reduce 
nuclear weapons m Europe The artillery weapons, even with improved 
range face a public perception of a "use it or lose it" deployment posture and 
potential targets of other Alliance countries and the emerging democratic 
countnes of Eastern Europe
The political and emotional arguments against short-range battlefield 
systems have been complimented by military cntics addressing planning 
factors and procedures for tactical nuclear employment There are 
considerable difficulties m maintaining and balancing the use of these 
weapons m a tactically effective manner and, at the same time, ensure 
escalation control, "decisive use," or maintain Alliance cohesion during the
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consultation process that appears to be "ill-suited to deal with the tactical 
uncertainty inherent in a request to release these weapons "91 These types of 
arguments, when considered with the emotional and political sentiment 
found in Europe, will probably force the removal of a significant amount of 
the Alliance's battlefield nuclear capability, and cut short most of NATO's 
modernization plans 92
These hurdles to modernization were not recognized in the original 
US research and development budget request for FY 91 This Department of 
Defense request included a 247 percent increase (to $112 2 million) for the 
FOTL and a 117percent increase (to $118 6 million) for the SRAM-T 93 The 
funds were requested when it was highly unlikely any ground-based missile 
system or artillery would be deployed m Europe, especially recalling the 
statements made by European members of the Alliance Additionally, 
Congress, under severe budget constraints, has, and will continue to attack 
these increases and attempt to influence weapon system choices and arms 
control propositions This pressure, from both Congress and the exigency of a 
unified Germany in NATO, certainly contributed to President Bush's 
termination decision well before any SNF arms control negotiations or a CFE 
agreement
These impediments to a decision on the course of nuclear weapons 
modernization, coupled with a declining threat will, at least, give NATO a 
wider margin for tactical deployment errors and arms control negotiations 
Even a third zero that removes the significant WTO advantage and lessens 
the threat against NATO's airfields (in conjunction with conventional forces 
postured at a negotiated panty), could be supported The trend for 
modernization seems to be summed up by a statement wntten in 1988 by 
authors discussing the impact of the INF Treaty on the defense structure of 
NATO
Given current sentiments about nuclear weapons among allied publics, 
the most that NATO probably can hope to do with regard to nuclear 
forces in Europe is to avoid a further slide toward denuclearization 94
The Warsaw Treaty Organization nuclear capability was growing and 
improvmg until 1989 The Defense Intelligence Agency released figures to 
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) reporting an increase from 3,780 to 8,095 nuclear 
capable artillery pieces for the penod 1980-1989 In the same period, SS21 
launchers went from five to 195 with the total Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons 
increasing from 7,994 (1980) to 12,315 (1989) Despite recent improvements 
and growth in the number of systems, the trend line is on a decline for the 
Warsaw Pact nuclear forces Withdrawal of Soviet nuclear forces and 
capabilities from the Pact countries and certain Soviet republics is occurring 
What is being done is a redeployment of weapons and not a shrinking of 
nuclear capability
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The Soviets Building Down7
For the Soviet Union, denuclearization proposals reinforce their preference 
for a lower nuclear weapons profile in Europe along with the implicit loss of 
nuclear capability and requirement for some substantial, asymmetric 
reductions Arms control initiatives are certainly influenced and driven by 
the substantial internal Soviet debate on the burden of defense on the Soviet 
economy There appears to be recognition by the civilian leadership that past 
Soviet military threat assessments and resulting force postures (or, using 
Soviet terminology, their measurement of the "correlation of forces") 
exceeded the Soviet Union's needs and economic capabilities by a debilitating 
margin
The predominant disarmament position on theater nuclear weapons 
espoused by the Soviet Union has been for a third "zero," where the first two 
"zeros" referred to the two classes of missiles eliminated with the INF Treaty 
and the third zero represented SNF weapons In 1981, Brezhnev called for the 
elimination of all nuclear weapons from Europe, as did Gorbachev m 1986, 
but new Soviet thinking on the concept of a mimmum nuclear deterrent m 
Europe seems to be emerging This may suggest a Soviet concern that 
conventional parity and defensive doctrine without some nuclear capability 
makes conventional war appear that much more calculable, and with the loss 
of its buffer territories and expansive land borders, a denuclearized Soviet 
Union might not be more secure 95
In Apnl, 1989, then Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergi Akhromeyev, 
argued agamst FOTL and the French Hadès system He saw these systems, 
with ranges just under the 500 km INF lower limit, running counter to the 
spint of the INF Treaty and representing not modernization efforts but an 
actual "build-up of nuclear might " Akhromeyev called for talks between the 
alliances to drastically reduce current inventories of theater level nuclear 
weapons to include land- and air-based missiles, aenal bombs, and artillery 
shells 96
Soviet Deputy Minister Karpov, as reported by TASS, considers a 
gradual withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons an appropnate goal given the 
expected breakthrough m conventional arms reductions He also noted 
complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons is the Soviet preference, but 
for now they are ready to reduce and not eliminate weapons, as an 
appropriate intermediary step 97
The former Soviet ambassador to the FRG, member of the Supreme 
Soviet, and a key adviser to President Gorbachev, Valentin Falm, has said the 
Soviet Union "does not rule out" a phased reduction of tactical nuclear 
weapons, and a report from the Soviet Institute of Europe of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences even posits a treaty that allows 500 to 1,000 European-
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based nuclear warheads 98 This idea is not very far from a NATO nuclear 
force posture proposed by Hans Binnendijk, the editor of the IISS journal, 
Survival His alternative suggests significant reductions m conventional 
arms that creates panty on the ground and the acceptance of a less flexible and 
more existential/general deterrence (possibly bolstered by the expanding 
French and British SLBM capacity) based on 1,000 air-delivered weapons 
(stand-off missiles and gravity bombs) The third zero is then negotiated 
eliminating the ground based missile systems which lead to the removal of 
nuclear artillery dnven by German political forces 99
In a Pravda piece, Karpov further reminds the reader of the Soviet's 
unilateral removal of 500 nuclear warheads from allied territory (166 air- 
launched warheads, 50 artillery warheads, and 284 missile warheads) in 1989 
'The USSR is not modernizing or replacing its tactical nuclear missiles and 
intends, m the event of an accord [ï e , CFE] on beginning talks, to embark on 
further major unilateral reductions in tactical missiles in Europe " 10° This 
was followed by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's announcement 
that the Soviet Union would withdraw 60 tactical missile launchers, 250 
atomic artillery units and 1,500 nuclear warheads from Central Europe 101
Whether this stance is making a virtue from a necessity (given the 
major level of negotiated withdrawals of Soviet forces from the NSWP 
countries), or is just tied to their negotiation tactics, remains to be seen
Building Down in the West
The debates and arguments on nuclear weapons in Europe are subject to the 
vicissitudes of the revolutionary political changes in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Umon, and the concurrent reduction in the military threat associated 
with the Warsaw Pact Within the Alliance there is a general trend 
supporting some modernization and concurrent bilateral arms control 
agreements But this approach must also consider the various elements of 
NATO security to include dynamic conventional and nuclear capabilities, a 
degenerating threat, and maintenance of Alliance political cohesion It is an 
involved and complicated process that greatly affects the fabnc of European 
security and suggests the importance of a political consensus to ensure that 
the stability and security objectives of arms control are effectively prosecuted 
There is evidence NATO does appreciate the "cohesion" element of the 
security and disarmament question
NATO's Nuclear Planmng Group, meeting at the Ministerial level, 
released a communique in October 1989, reaffirming the Alliance 
commitment to the ideals of the Harmel Report and the need to "keep 
NATO's nuclear forces responsive, survivable and effective across the 
required spectrum of ranges at the lowest possible levels consistent with our 
security requirements,' and at the same time noted, 'that the removal of the
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imbalance m conventional forces would provide scope for further reduction 
in the sub-strategic nuclear forces of NATO, though it would not obviate the 
need for such forces "102
The specific sentiments expressed by individual countries, however, 
tend to be slightly different from the tone established by the NPG's 
communique Although overshadowed by the debate and discussions on 
German unification, open argument on the future direction of the European 
nuclear forces has become more prevalent The topics tend to focus on the 
issues of modernization and reduction of forces, and certainly not strategy or 
tactics The center of the political controversy rests in West Germany Once 
the political forces get a hold on the unification process, nuclear arms will 
resurface as a contentious pomt of debate and division throughout the 
European political environment
Within the ERG there is growing popular opposition to nuclear capable 
artillery and short-range nuclear missiles A similar concern on aircraft does 
not seem prevalent, presumably because of the greater range capability that 
places potential targets for those weapons more on the attacker's territory In 
December 1989, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietnch Genscher discussed 
future disarmament directions and admitted the need for nuclear weapons as 
a deterrent, but added that he could not "imagine anyone could still propose 
to acquire new short-range missiles, which are only aimed at the 
democratized German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, or at Poland, 
and, as noted earlier, nor could he support TASM deployment m Germany 
Such statements by NATO as, "Short-range nuclear weapons are not aimed at 
the Poles or the Hungarians They're aimed at attacking armies," are very 
accurate and do try to convey an objective or apolitical perspective on the 
topic, but these pronouncements fail to contradict the popular/emotional 
element of the debate103
West German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg's earlier 
pronouncement that reduced nuclear forces would be discussed by the three 
nuclear powers m Western Europe shifted m March 1990 Now, according to 
Stoltenberg, German unification and the subsiding East-West tensions dictate 
the removal of all nuclear artillery Even Mrs Thatcher has come to accept 
that short-range nuclear weapons, including artillery, should be phased 
ou t104 General Galvm, SACEUR, has characterized the deployment of a pre- 
positioned Lance in Britain as not politically tenable, and the Chairman of the 
NATO Military Committee supports the reduction of short-range nuclear 
forces, after a CFE agreement105
The earlier US position was a commitment to the "Alliance decision" 
on modernization, and deployment decisions to occur after CFE President 
Bush, in June 1989, said the US would agree to "lower, equal, and verifiable" 
levels of short-range nuclear missiles, but some short-range nuclear weapons
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would be required for a credible deterrent "for the foreseeable future " 106 By 
May 1990, as noted earlier, the political climate led the Bush administration to 
terminate FOTL and stop modernization of European-based nuclear artillery
A potential hurdle to reductions is the French government's stance on 
nuclear forces and their role in the grand strategy of the Fifth Republic They 
express concern on the preponderance of WTO tactical weapons that need to 
be eliminated before any Alliance reduction is considered France also 
supports NATO's commitment to the possibility of negotiations on short- 
range theater nuclear forces, but France's "deterrence is a global deterrence, its 
character is strategic and our pre-strategic weapons cannot be separated out 
from this concept " Current policy pronouncements suggest French nuclear 
aviation and SLBM forces, and all short-range weapons are excluded from 
future negotiations "At the present state of affairs, France will never accept 
the inclusion into negotiations of her deterrent force which is mimmal and 
which has, essentially, a political and stabilizing role " 107
France does, however, enthusiastically support reduction in the 
US/USSR strategic arsenals as, "the reduction of these two nuclear Himalayas 
constitute for us the real pnonty on the arms control agenda " 108 Given the 
strong national support for their strategic and pre-strategic forces, it seems 
doubtful any unilateral reductions will occur in France If any significant 
changes m French modernization efforts or nuclear policy and strategy do 
occur, they will be generated at the highest executive levels of the French 
Fifth Republic and precipitated by reductions in US and Soviet strategic arms, 
reductions well beyond the numbers available under START
Much like the French, the UK argues that if the US and USSR were to 
make substantial cuts m their strategic arms and no significant 
improvements in Moscow's ABM capabilities were to occur, they would 
certainly contribute to arms control given the change m threat As expressed 
m Britain's 1990 "Defense White Paper," "Reduction in US and Soviet 
strategic arsenals would have to go much further before we could even 
consider including the British deterrent m any further negotiations on 
strategic nuclear weapons " 109
NATO's continued "dual-track" commitment to modernization and 
discussion on short-range nuclear force reductions after a CFE agreement 
might just be "overcome by events " The scales of modernization and arms 
reductions are tipping m the direction of reduction, without continued 
modernization The lessening threat may very well force an Alliance 
decision to reduce the number of theater warheads from 4,000 to 1,000 (mostly 
aircraft delivered) without the assurances and security of a negotiated 
agreement110
Although NATO's specific direction is to develop a military strategy 
consistent with a reduced reliance on sub-strategic nuclear weapons once a
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Although NATO's specific direction is to develop a military strategy 
consistent with a reduced reliance on sub-strategic nuclear weapons once a 
CFE agreement is signed, the US and the Soviet Union should begin 
negotiations to reduce the number of SNF After these negotiations begin, 
" the Alliance will propose, m return for reciprocal action by the Soviet 
Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe " m
Conclusion
YJe are not dealing simply with a military or scientific problem but with a
problem in statecraft and the ways of the human spint
—Report on the Control of Atomic Energy 1946
The momentum for reductions in European nuclear forces is substantial 
The "intent" variable of the deterrent equation is making modernization of 
NATO's nuclear forces politically nsky, especially in this time of rapid change 
m European governments Threat perceptions have dropped to levels which 
encourage the citizens of Europe to truly question the utility of a theater 
nuclear capability
On the other hand, the "capability" element of deterrence is more 
problematic Force reductions and posture changes have all but eliminated 
the quick-stnke threat of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, but even with a 
CFE Treaty and its mherent reductions, there will remain m Europe a great 
military capability, especially nuclear
The prospects for maintaining deterrence and escalation control could 
certainly be served by a lower balance of theater nuclear forces The 
economic, political, social, and demographic forces all suggest a significant 
shrinking of military capability throughout Europe and an equilibnous 
deterrent equation The best, most secure path to effect this reduction is a 
negotiated treaty with appropnate levels of verification designed to confirm 
and validate the status of treaty limited items, but even with a verifiable 
reduction in capability, the potential for conflict is not eliminated, it is only 
reduced Cognizance of this dilemma is demonstrated in pronouncements 
from the East and the West, and is highlighted by the West's continuing 
commitment to some (specific numbers and types of weapons still to be 
determined by NATO's NPG) nuclear deterrent, albeit greatly reduced and 
certainly less "flexible," and the Soviets backing away from an earlier 
commitment to a "third zero " 112
The paths to these reductions may either be negotiated or unilateral 
Weapons with lessening relevance, e g , artillery, are pnme candidates for 
unilateral reduction, if the numbers are small As the weapons relevance or
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combat potential increases (or the raw numbers involved become too 
militarily significant) negotiated agreements offer important advantages over 
unilateral reductions, e g , verification provisions, ratified treaties make 
reversals to previous force postures politically more difficult, and negotiated 
agreements have a stronger potential for channelling reductions m a 
direction contributing to increased stability As the security risks and costs 
rise, so should one's caution and deliberateness
The scope of the next bilateral (or multilateral) talks will most likely 
address ground-based missile systems, especially if a verifiable weapon-to- 
launcher ratio is established This area holds the greatest potential for 
significant and verifiable reductions Negotiating the battlefield and/or 
theater level missiles implies an asymmetric reduction by the Soviets and 
also offers the potential to exclude the French systems from negotiations, at 
least until a more equivalent level of parity is reached m this particular 
weapons arena For the West, reductions in these Soviet systems would 
lower the nsk from preemptive attacks and contribute to a mutual shift to a 
"minimum deterrent" based on air-launched systems augmented by 
existential sea-based systems and aircraft This greater-than-zero objective for 
the negotiations, while makmg verification more difficult (1 e , when 
compared to verifying destroyed missiles as under the INF Treaty) does 
maintain some potential for maintenance of a "flexible response," albeit one 
explicitly and implicitly modified from the current version 113
Likely advantages for the Soviets are a bit more problematic, but do 
exist An agreement leading to a phased reduction of Soviet battlefield 
missile capability does not, at first, seem likely because of the asymmetry 
involved, but when one considers the Soviet drive for "reasonable 
sufficiency," certain coherent objectives emerge An agreement would reduce 
the number of nuclear weapons and possibly lead to savings through 
reductions m conventional forces, outside of CFE A more important 
objective might consider this treaty as a means to moderate western European 
nuclear force modernization and "decrease incentives for the creation of an 
independent Western European nuclear force structure " 114 Additionally, 
Soviet reductions have a somewhat moderating (some say weakening) effect 
on NATO's political cohesion (possibly NATO's greatest asset) by increasing 
the contentious debate on Flexible Response, FOFA, and Forward Defense115
As to the remainder of European nuclear forces, reduction will be 
moderated by a variety of concerns First, there is a general consensus against 
a totally denuclearized Europe Motives for this position range from fears of 
conventional deterrence failing to make the risk of war incalculable, to 
national perceptions that the capacity to deploy nuclear weapons is a 
significant testimony of power and influence Second, the changing threat 
and the public perception of the threat suggests a nuclear force posture 
significantly smaller, but one with a credible delivery capability, recalling the
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significantly smaller, but one with a credible delivery capability, recalling the 
words of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz, 'Under the 
new conditions we face today, a greater reliance on dual-capable aircraft and 
sea-based systems would be appropriate," and, as expressed m Soviet Military 
Power 1989, " if large numbers of deep-strike aircraft such as Fencers and 
Backfires are actually removed from the inventory, destroyed or placed in 
non-flyable storage (and not just re-based), the Soviet ability to conduct 
offensive operations will be reduced " 116 This nuclear force posture, 
representing the increasing influence and significance of British and French 
nuclear forces, will provide a deterrent capability anchored in a redefined 
concept of Flexible Response, MC 14/4 The development of this nuclear 
force posture should include a negotiated arms control process to equalize 
capabilities at significantly lower levels and make reversals to previous force 
levels more politically difficult
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